Why Over‑Privileged Apps Are One of the Most Dangerous Attack Paths in Microsoft Entra

“Applications can be incredibly powerful. If you own the application, you can act as that application. And if that application is highly privileged, you could effectively become a global admin without ever being in that group.”

Nicolas Blank, Identity Architect, Microsoft MVP, and CTO of NBConsult

In Microsoft Entra, being an application owner can be as powerful than being a Global Administrator. In many tenants, that reality isn’t documented, reviewed, or even understood. That makes application identities one of the easiest ways for attackers to escalate privileges without touching traditional admin roles.

That observation from Nicolas Blank neatly captures a security risk that many Microsoft Entra tenants still underestimate. In a recent conversation, Blank explained why application identities, and not just users, are now one of the most dangerous attack paths in cloud environments. He also explained why organizations urgently need better visibility into what their apps can do.

Why app ownership can be more dangerous than admin roles

The core risk An attacker doesn’t need to become a global admin. They only need: – Access to a standard user account – Ownership of a highly privileged app – The ability to authenticate as that app

Modern Microsoft Entra tenants are full of non-human identities, including applications, service principals, and increasingly, AI agents. Each of these identities can be granted permissions that are equivalent to those held by Global Admins.

“Once you have authenticated as that application, you are everything that application is, including all of the privileges that it has.”, Blank said.

How over-permission became the default

Most over-privileged apps aren’t created with malicious intent. They happen when teams rely on over-broad defaults, copy sample configurations that “just work,” and carry legacy permissions forward into production. The result is predictable: permissions accrete over time, ownership changes, and nobody revisits whether the access is still justified.

Backup applications are a common offender because teams often grant them broad access across core services by default.

These applications often combine directory, user, mail, and SharePoint permissions, not because they genuinely require them, but because no one challenges the defaults.

The fastest path from user access to tenant control

If an attacker compromises a user account, their next step is often to look for a faster route to tenant‑wide privileges than traditional admin role assignment.

Even organizations enforcing multifactor authentication (MFA) are not immune. Token theft and adversary-in-the-middle attacks can still allow attackers to enumerate applications and identify dangerous ownership relationships. At that point, the application, not the user, becomes the attack vehicle.

That’s why application security must be treated as an identity problem, not simply an app configuration issue.

Why basic security hygiene still matters

Basic controls like multifactor authentication (MFA), patching, antivirus, and Conditional Access still stop most opportunistic attacks.

“If you’ve got MFA, patched machines, decent antivirus, and conditional access in place, then 96% of attacks are worthless.”

You can’t secure what you can’t see

Because many organizations don’t have a clear view of which apps are privileged and who owns them, the first priority is simply surfacing those relationships.

“If you didn’t know before, you know now. Everything starts with inventory.”

Start with visibility: map which apps have high privileges and who controls them.

Blank’s Privileged App Path Auditor is one example of that approach. It surfaces applications that are over-privileged, who owns them, and what remediation steps you could consider. In many cases, the right response is not removal but permission scoping, ownership review, or improved monitoring.

AI agents: the next identity blind spot

The same ownership and over-permission problems now apply to AI agents, often with even less scrutiny. That makes them a force multiplier for the exact risks described earlier.

AI agents also make the visibility problem worse by rapidly increasing the number of non-human identities being created in Entra. In many organizations, these identities are created outside established governance processes.

“Every time you build something with AI, you’ve just built another identity in Entra, and you don’t know what it can do.”, Blank pointed out.

Agents require permissions to operate. If those permissions are not carefully scoped and audited, they create new attack paths that few organizations are currently equipped to monitor. In some scenarios, agents can even act on behalf of users, amplifying the impact of prompt injection or poisoned content.

Awareness over alarm

The point isn’t to panic; it’s to recognize that these privilege paths exist and that administrators have choices in how they reduce risk.

“I’m not telling you what to do. I’m telling you: did you know this existed, and did you know you had options?”

Applications, service principals, and AI agents are now first‑class identities in Microsoft Entra. Treating them differently from human administrators is no longer viable. They require the same inventory, governance, monitoring, and periodic review.

For organizations serious about Zero Trust and least privilege, auditing application identities is no longer optional.

Start by identifying which apps have tenant-wide permissions and reviewing who owns them. Apply the same governance to AI agents as you onboard them, so visibility keeps pace with adoption.

Watch the full interview here: